In this paper the existence of unemployment is partly explained as being the result of coordination failures. This is achieved by considering a standard general equilibrium model and splitting the set of commodities in two groups. The first group contains commodities like gold. The prices of these commodities are fully flexible, even in the short run, and their markets always clear. The prices of the commodities in the second group are rigid in the short run (for instance labour services or some consumer goods) and households and firms may expect restricted supply possibilities. We show that such expectations are self-enforcing, even if all prices of commodities in the second group are competitive. In that case it is shown that as a result of coordination failures a continuum of equilibria results, among which an equilibrium with approximately no trade in the commodities of the second group, and a Walrasian equilibrium. In fact, these coordination failures also arise at other price systems, but then unemployment is the result of both a wrong price system and coordination failures.
Introduction
The standard explanation for underutilisation of resources given by general equilibrium theory is that relative prices are wrong. For instance, if wages are too high, this may lead to an excess supply of labour, and consequently to unemployment. This, in turn, may lead to a lower total income of workers and a lower total demand for commodities. Consequently, also firms may face restricted possibilities for sales and underutilisation of resources. Seminal work that generalizes these lines of thought has been done in Bénassy (1975) , Drèze (1975) , and Younès (1975) . For a recent survey of this work, see Bénassy (1993) .
More recently, another explanation for the underutilisation of resources has been given in a game-theoretic framework by Roberts (1987a Roberts ( , 1987b Roberts ( , 1989a Roberts ( , 1989b . He considers a game that has several stages corresponding to the choice of prices and wages by firms and workers, the supply of labour and the demand for commodities by workers, and the actual hiring and production by firms. If firms expect that the total demand for their output is low, then they will hire only a limited amount of labour. This will have a negative impact on income of workers and thereby indeed lead to a low demand for outputs. Workers, expecting to be (partially) unemployed, supply limited amounts of labour and express low demands for commodities. In the work of Roberts it is shown that such expectations can be rational, even at Walrasian prices, and equilibria range from zero employment and zero output to the Walrasian equilibrium 1 .
Results similar to those of Roberts date back even earlier.
In the framework of a generalized game Heller and Starr (1979) obtain a continuum of myopic complete information equilibria ranging from an equilibrium with zero employment and zero output to the Walrasian equilibrium. In their generalized game prices are a priori given, and should be competitive for the result mentioned. There is only one stage where both firms and households make offers to buy and to sell simultaneously in all markets. The intuitions and even the conditions required, homothetic preferences and constant returns to scale production, are closely related to those in the models of Roberts. In this paper it is shown that these results hold quite generally. Commodities are separated into two groups. The first group contains commodities like gold (or in a financial setting bonds or stocks) for which the price is fully flexible and therefore rationing cannot occur, even in the short run. The second group contains commodities like labour services that have rigid prices in the short run. Therefore, households and firms may expect restricted supply possibilities of these commodities due to coordination failures.
We will show that even if one takes the prices of the commodities in the second group equal to competitive values, there exists a continuum of underemployment equilibria, among which an equilibrium with approximately no trade in the markets for the group II commodities and a full employment equilibrium. The equilibrium with approx-imately no trade in the markets for the group II commodities is called an approximate no-trade equilibrium. This is somewhat misleading, since in general there is trade in the group I commodities. All unemployment resulting in the underemployment equilibria may be viewed as a result of coordination failures since the relative prices of the group II commodities are right, and the prices of the group I commodities are completely flexible. This makes the case where the fixed prices are competitive the most pure and illustrative case. Therefore, this case will be analysed in more detail.
A robust example with an empty set of group I commodities is constructed where the Walrasian equilibrium price system is unique, while at Walrasian prices there are only two different underemployment equilibrium allocations, the no-trade equilibrium allocation and the Walrasian equilibrium allocation. Although, there is still a continuum of underemployment equilibria in that example, i.e. a continuum of expectations, almost all of these equilibria lead to the same equilibrium allocation. Therefore, the question is addressed, given competitive prices for the group II commodities, whether in general one may expect a continuum of underemployment equilibrium allocations and, furthermore, whether there is a connected subset of the set of underemployment equilibria containing both an approximate no-trade equilibrium and a Walrasian equilibrium. Such a result would imply the existence of a continuum of allocations in a neighbourhood of the competitive allocation. The example makes clear that the latter property cannot be true in general. However, in the most interesting case where the set of group I commodities is nonempty it can be shown that generically in the initial endowments there is a continuum of underemployment equilibrium allocations, while for the case with an empty set of group I commodities a very weak condition guarantees this. Under somewhat stronger conditions it can also be guaranteed that a Walrasian equilibrium is connected to an approximate no-trade equilibrium. The commodities are split into two groups, labeled I and II. Whenever such a label is attached to a symbol, it is meant to refer to the group of commodities indicated by the label. For instance, L I will denote the number and the set of group I commodities. Without loss of generality, group I consists of the first L I commodities. The prices of commodities in group I are assumed to be completely flexible, even in the short run. The markets for these commodities are organized in such a way that prices will immediately react to small changes in supply or demand. Examples are auctions (as for fish) or organized (commodity or stock) exchanges. The markets for these commodities are therefore never cleared by rationing in an equilibrium. The prices of commodities in group II on the contrary are fixed in the short run. Like many markets in the real world, small changes in supply or demand are not immediately reflected by a change in the price. Hence there is scope for rationing in the markets for these commodities, and agents in the economy may indeed expect rationing to occur in these markets. If group I is empty, then all prices are fixed in the short run. This is the case often studied in the fixed-price literature. Still, for many commodities, such an assumption seems too strong even in the short run. Therefore, we are mainly interested in the case where group I is non-empty. We will assume that group II is non-empty, since otherwise we are back in the standard competitive framework. In general the total demand might not be equal to the total supply of commodities in group II at price system p II , so households and firms may expect restrictions concerning their net demand or their net supply, following the lines of thought of the seminal contributions of Bénassy (1975) , Drèze (1975), and Younès (1975) . Both for households and for firms, restrictions on supply seem to occur much more frequently in western economies as has also been remarked by van der Laan (1980) and Kurz (1982) . Many households are restricted in their supply of labour and many firms in their supply of outputs. Therefore, in this paper attention will be restricted to cases with rationing on the supply side of households and firms, while the demand side will never be rationed. In the case of excess supplies, one needs a distributional rule to determine the final allocation that will result. Such a distributional rule is called a rationing system. In this paper we will consider the case where each household and each firm has a fixed predetermined market share, which allows for uniform rationing as a special case. Our existence results hold a fortiori for more general rationing schemes admitting fixed predetermined market shares as a special case.
The Model
The vector α ∈ IR HL II ++ determines the market shares of the households (its components are denoted by α h l ) and the vector β ∈ IR F L II ++ (with components denoted by β f l ) those of the firms. This rationing system implies that for every commodity l ∈ L II there exists r l ∈ IR + such that the supply possibilities for every household h of commodity l are given by α h l r l and the supply possibilities for every firm f of commodity l are equal to β f l r l . We could normalize α and β such that, for every l ∈ L II , h∈H α
is the share of household h and β f l is the share of firm f in the total possible supply of commodity l. These vectors α and β only determine the supply possibilities of households and firms. Clearly, a household and a firm are completely free to demand a commodity and not to make use at all of the supply possibilities. The rationing system is treated like a black box. In reality these market shares are determined by all kind of factors that we will ignore in our model like the ability of suppliers to sell their products, the location of households and firms, or the existing relationships between them.
The expectations of available opportunities for a household h (firm f ) on the various markets are described by a vector z h ∈ −IR the expected opportunities are required to be rational. These expectations should therefore match the amounts allocated by the rationing system. So, for the case of the rationing system with market shares, the set of all expected opportunities that are relevant is given by the L II -dimensional set ZY , where
Firms are assumed to be profit maximizers. For every firm f, given expected opportu
+ , the set of feasible production plans, s f (y f ), is defined by
Similarly, for every firm f, given a price system p ∈ IR L and expected opportunities y f ∈ IR L II + , the set of production plans maximizing profit, η f (p, y f ), is defined by 
and its demand set δ
The total excess demand in the economy, given p ∈ IR L and expected opportunities (z, y) ∈ ZY , is defined by
We are now in a position to give a definition of an underemployment equilibrium. This definition is also used in Drèze (1997 
For every firm f ∈ F, the production possibility set is described by a twice continuously differentiable function
, and for any y f on the production frontier {y
A7.
The economy E has a well-defined aggregate excess demand function z : IR
The often made assumption in the fixed-price literature that
h is replaced by the weaker assumption A1. Examples where the usual assumptions are not satisfied but ours are, concern group II commodities for which there is a clear physical upper bound on consumption in a given time interval, or commodities that can only be consumed together with a sufficient amount of another commodity. For instance, consumption at a remote place can only take place together with certain transportation services or some services cannot be supplied without sufficient education. Assumption A2 implies that there is non-satiation with respect to the group I commodities and with respect to the group II commodities, a much weaker requirement than monotonicity of preferences.
A preference relation h is said to be convex if
The somewhat clumsy statement of Assumptions A2 and A3 guarantees that for the case L II = 0 we make the same assumptions as Debreu (1959) . For the case L II ≥ 1, our assumptions coincide with those of Debreu for an economy consisting of the first L I commodities. Assumption A6, which will be needed for part of the results, states the standard differentiability requirements on the primitive concepts, see for instance Mas-Colell (1985) .
In addition to these primitive assumptions about individual agents, we shall need for our strongest result (Theorem 3.1.iii) an assumption akin to gross substitution. The assumption used in our proof of that result is a weaker form of the more intuitive Assumption A7. In the case of exchange economies, A7 could be stated for individual demands and would be preserved under aggregation. For this case Movshovich (1994) gives assumptions on primitive concepts implying a stronger form of A7. When individual incomes include profits, a lucid statement is only possible in terms of aggregate demand.
Assumption A7 states that the net demand for any one good does not increase when the prices and/or supply possibilities of other commodities are decreased. It is not required that the net demand for the other commodities increases. Actually, we only use that assumption starting from a competitive equilibrium, and still in weaker form. But we are unable to
illustrate meaningfully what is gained by the weakening. For instance, the assumptions on individual primitives required to guarantee gross substitution at a competitive equilibrium imply gross substitution everywhere.
We could state A7 for correspondences, following Polterovich and Spivak (1983) , but we use it in conjunction with A6, hence for functions, and therefore state it for functions.
The Existence Theorem
By Debreu (1959) , (1) and (2) page 77, it follows that the set of attainable allocations of the economy E,
Since A is compact, such a b exists, and since (e, 0) ∈ A it follows that b > max h∈H,l∈L e h l . Observe that all potentially different underemployment equilibria are obtained when attention is restricted to expected oppor-
The set of underemployment equilibria sustained by such expectations is denoted by E.
The extend to which the market for a commodity l ∈ L II is employed in an underem-
where
If υ l = 0, then the market for commodity l has collapsed completely and no supply is expected to take place. If υ l = 1, then no binding constraints on supply are expected in the market for commodity l. We will need this measure of employment to distinguish between different underemployment equilibria. 
contains a continuum of strongly different underemployment equilibria.
Interpretation of the Theorem
Theorem 3.1.i states that there is a connected set of underemployment equilibria ranging from an underemployment equilibrium with arbitrarily low trade in the group II commodities to an equilibrium without rationing in the market for at least one group II commodity. The markets for the group I commodities are in equilibrium without rationing. This means that there are many different expectations leading to an underemployment equilibrium, ranging from the expectations that no household and no firm will supply a positive amount of any group II commodity, to the expectations that at least in one market for group II commodities free trade without rationing is possible. it holds that no household and no firm faces binding expected opportunities in the market for commodity l, so
, ∀f ∈ F, and υ l is equal to one. These two "extreme" equilibria are contained in a connected set of underemployment equilibria and this connected set contains a continuum of potentially different equilibria. Recall that two underemployment equilibria are potentially different if at least one household has a different set of possible choices. We will show by means of Example 4.1 in Section 4 that it is possible that there is no underemployment equilibrium in the set E with υ l exactly equal to 0 for all l.
The notion of potentially different is rather weak, since it is not claimed that potentially different underemployment equilibria are in fact different. Theorem 3.1 is striking since it even holds in the circumstances that are most favourable for competitive equilibrium: all prices of group II commodities equal to competitive values and, in a world with time and uncertainty, all future commodities belong to group I. The intuition behind Theorem 3.1 is the same as the explanation given in the introduction for the results of Roberts. If firms expect that the total demand for output is low, then they will hire only a limited amount of labour. This has a negative impact on the income of workers and thereby indeed leads to a low demand for outputs. As Drèze (1997) argues, this reasoning can be given empirical underpinning. Theorem 3.1 shows that this reasoning can also be verified formally. For the result to hold one also needs downwards rigidity of the prices of the group II commodities. Otherwise, excess supplies of group II commodities could lead to lower prices of these commodities. However, Theorem 3.1 makes clear that also at those lower prices, there is again scope for coordination failures. It may be difficult to get out of a situation with coordination failures. All the households and firms together would have to revise their expectations simultaneously.
Following the arguments of Drèze (1997) , Theorem 3.1 has even more important economic consequences. For instance, it makes clear that the observation of excess supply is not sufficient to infer the existence of price and wage distortions. Indeed, Theorem 3.1.i and 3.1.ii hold for any price system for the group II commodities, whereas the prices of the group I commodities are completely flexible. When prices or wages are not at competitive values, their distorting effects can even be magnified by coordination failures as expressed in Theorem 3.1.i. Because of the multiplicity of underemployment equilibria, the modelling of dynamics becomes crucial, and history will play an important role. In the presence of coordination failures, price and wage dynamics might not be very helpful in getting back to a competitive allocation of resources and can even worsen the situation. For a further development of these arguments in two macroeconomic models, the Real Business Cycle model and the Barro-Grossman-Malinvaud model, see Drèze (1997) .
The Case Without Group I Commodities
Since much of the fixed-price literature considers the case L I = 0 and this case is probably the clearest for illustrative purposes, we treat it in somewhat more detail here. The proof of Theorem 3.1.i will be given for H ≥ 1 and L I ≥ 0. Even if L I = 0 there will be a continuum of potentially different equilibria. In an economy with only one household and no production, there are no different underemployment equilibria. Example 4.2 is a robust example of a Cobb-Douglas economy with H = 2 and L I = 0 such that in every underemployment equilibrium all households keep their initial endowments. By Theorem 3.1.ii such an example cannot be given if L I is greater than or equal to one. But the example is not fully convincing since the price system considered is rather extreme. Suppose the prices of the group II commodities are compatible with a Walrasian equilibrium price system for the entire economy. Is it still possible that all underemploy-ment equilibria, except the ones corresponding to the Walrasian equilibrium, are utility equivalent at Walrasian prices? The question will be answered affirmatively by means of the robust Example 4.3. Assume that at every underemployment equilibrium with max l∈L υ l = 1 there is trade on some of the markets. Since there is a component of the set of underemployment equilibria connecting such an underemployment equilibrium to an approximate no-trade equilibrium, this implies the existence of a continuum of different underemployment equilibria. The weak conditions of Theorem 3.2 are such that trade in some of the markets occurs at every underemployment equilibrium with max l∈L υ l = 1. By 0 −l for some l ∈ L we will denote expected opportunities of no supply possibilities in the market for every commodity in L being different from l , and no rationing in the market for commodity l , so z 
The additional condition we need to have a continuum of strongly different underemployment equilibria is very weak. Indeed, we require that for every commodity there exists a household or a firm that is willing to supply it if it expects no restrictions on the supply of this commodity, but it expects not to have supply possibilities of any other commodity, whereas the household does not receive any profit income. The assumption means that for every labour service there is a household willing to supply it, while for every intermediate product or consumer good there is a firm willing to supply it, under the conditions that the household expects to be fully restricted in the supply of all other labour services (and land, etc.) and receives no profit income, while the firm expects to be fully restricted in the supply of any other output. Requiring this at Walrasian prices would considerably weaken the assumption, since Walrasian prices are already balanced in some sense. Moreover, that we only need the assumption in the case households or firms expect to be fully restricted in the supply of all other commodities is also pleasant, since it means that supplying the commodity under consideration is the only way to achieve a positive income. The proof of Theorem 3.1.iii will be given for H ≥ 1 and
0 the underemployment equilibria range from an approximate no-trade equilibrium to a competitive equilibrium under A1-A7.
Relation to the Literature
In the early fixed-price literature, where L I = 0 and there is no rationing in the market for an a priori numeraire commodity, Silvestre (1980) gives a robust example with a continuum of equilibria when the fixed price is taken equal to a competitive price. Although the example is robust, it is also possible to give robust examples with a unique equilibrium. The continuum of Silvestre is obtained by varying the rationing system. For instance, in case there is an excess supply in a market and there are two suppliers of the corresponding commodity, both facing binding rationing, then any distribution of the demand among the suppliers may yield an equilibrium. Indeed, if in the set-up of the fixed-price literature a rationing system is specified, then the results of Laroque and Polemarchakis (1978) imply that there is generically a finite number of equilibria and the results of Herings (1996b) , Chapter 11, that there is generically an odd number of equilibria. For the case L I = 0 and no production, van der Laan (1982) states a result similar to Theorem 3.1.i, using arguments from combinatorial optimization. Using that approach such a result was indeed shown to be correct in Herings (1993) . For that much simpler case the result is even true for υ = 0. In Herings (1993) it is shown as well that the connectedness property a component possesses, is very strong and can be used to generate all kinds of interesting corollaries. In Citanna, Crès, and Villanacci (1995) 
Three Examples
In Section 3 it has been promised that we would give an example of an economy without an underemployment equilibrium at which υ l = 0 for all l ∈ L II .
Example 4.1 Consider the economy E = ((IR
and L II = 1. The rationing system (α, β) can be chosen arbitrarily (satisfying A5). This example satisfies A1-A5. Therefore we know by Theorem 3.1.i that there exists a connected set of underemployment equilibria that contains an underemployment equilibrium with max l∈L II υ l = υ 2 = υ, for all υ ∈ (0, 1]. Solving the firm's profit maximization problem yields that for every p 1 ∈ IR + , for every y
Since the firm never wants to supply commodity 2, it is never affected by the opportunities expected in this market. Let the household be constrained by x 1 2 − 1 ≥ −υ. If it supplies υ to the firm, then p 1 = 2 √ υ is required for profit maximization. At that price, the unconstrained demand of the household is x 1 = (1+
, in which case the constraint is binding. There is a continuum of strongly different equilibria for υ ∈ (0,
] with p 1 = 2 √ υ; but there is no equilibrium at υ = 0, since this would imply p 1 = 0 and excess demand of good 1.
If an input vector subject to supply rationing is used to produce an output not subject to supply rationing and desired by consumers, then technology and tastes should be such that there exists a relative price for the output at which it is neither supplied nor demanded, given the prices and expected opportunities for the other goods. It is difficult to formulate assumptions on primitives that imply such a property, which should be related to the existence of a finite rate of transformation of inputs into outputs.
The following, robust, example of a Cobb-Douglas economy shows that it is possible that in every underemployment equilibrium all households keep their initial endowments.
Example 4.2 Consider the economy E = ((IR
, and 2 by the utility
so we consider an economy without production possibilities, or, alternatively, an economy where all production has already taken place. Furthermore, ((θ fh ) h∈H ) f ∈F , α, and β can be chosen arbitrarily (but should of course satisfy A4 and A5). Notice that A1-A5 are satisfied by this economy, so we know by Theorem 3.1.i that there exists a connected set of underemployment equilibria ranging from an approximate no-trade equilibrium to an equilibrium without rationing in at least one market and containing a continuum of potentially different underemployment equilibria. Let us compute the set of underemployment equilibria directly. If both households expect no restrictions with respect to the supply of commodity 2, then the optimal consumption bundle of household 1 is (10/3, 5/12) and the optimal consumption bundle of household 2 is (5/3, 10/12). This means that both households supply commodity 2 in exchange for commodity 1. Notice that irrespective of the supply possibilities consumers expect for both commodities, at the price system (1/5, 4/5) they will supply commodity 2 in exchange for commodity 1, unless they expect both to be fully rationed on the supply of commodity 2. It follows that there is a continuum of underemployment equilibria, given by ( p II , e, 0, z * , y * ) with (z * , y * ) ∈ ZY , where both households keep the initial endowments, z * 1 2 = z * 2 2 = 0, and z * 1 is arbitary. All equilibria are characterized by full rationing of the supply of commodity 2, υ 2 = 0, whereas the expected opportunities for supply of commodity 1 do not really matter. The impossibility of supply of commodity 2 leads to zero net demand of commodity 1 for both households. Although the expectations with respect to the market for commodity 1 do not really matter for the equilibrium allocation, there is a continuum of potentially different underemployment equilibria ranging from the expectations that no supply is possible in the market for commodity 1, υ 1 = 0, to the expectations that there are no supply restrictions in the market for commodity 1, υ 1 = 1.
Although the underemployment equilibria in Example 4.2 are potentially different, they are different in a weak sense. They are not different or strongly different as defined in Section 2. But the example is not fully convincing since the price system considered is rather extreme. Example 4.3 shows that it is possible that all underemployment equilibria, except the ones corresponding to the unique Walrasian equilibrium, are utility equivalent at Walrasian prices. preferences of the other households are such that their (unrationed) demand as a function of the price system is differentiable, and their demands at price system (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) sum up to their total initial endowments. Then it follows easily that taking c large enough guarantees that the Walrasian equilibrium price system (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is unique. Notice that if p = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), household 3 wants to keep its initial endowments and is therefore never affected by expectations concerning the supply possibilities in any of the markets. The rather artificial household 3 is used only to show that the rather strange phenomena of the example are not related to the issue of uniqueness of the Walrasian equilibrium. Household 3 can be dispensed with entirely if so desired. Households 1 and 2 have preferences and initial endowments as indicated in Figures  2a and 2b . For those figures it is assumed that p = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). Using Walras' law, the amount of the third commodity can be determined by measuring the distance to the fourty-five degree line. There is no production,
Example 4.3 Consider the economy E = ((IR
The rationing system is determined by arbitrarily chosen α ∈ IR HL ++ and β ∈ IR F L ++ . The example is constructed in such a way that A1-A5 are satisfied by this economy. So we know by Theorem 3.1.i that there exists a connected set of underemployment equilibria ranging from an approximate no-trade equilibrium to an equilibrium without rationing in at least one market and containing a continuum of potentially different underemployment equilibria. Moreover, one of the underemployment equilibria is given by the Walrasian equilibrium since we consider Walrasian prices.
We will again compute the set of underemployment equilibria. household is not rationed in the markets for commodities 1 and 2, and expects supply possibilities z 1 3 in the market for commodity 3, is depicted ( Figure 2b the demand of household 2 at expected opportunities that are such that the household is not rationed in the markets for commodities 1 and 3, and supply possibilities z For this example we claim that there are only two different underemployment equilibria. The first one is given by the no-trade equilibrium where everyone keeps his initial endowment, and the second one by the Walrasian equilibrium. The claim will be proved in three steps.
Step 1. It is shown that there is no underemployment equilibrium close to (but not equal to) the Walrasian equilibrium. If z 1 3 is in absolute value smaller than but close to the Walrasian equilibrium value, x * 1
, so the only way an underemployment equilibrium may result is that household 2 expects no restrictions with respect to supply in any market, which yields the Walrasian equilibrium). However, by no choice of z Therefore, there is no underemployment equilibrium being close to the Walrasian equilibrium.
Step 2. It is shown that z 2 1 = z 1 3 = 0 yields the no-trade equilibrium, irrespective of the value of z 2 2 . This step is obvious and yields the connected set of underemployment equilibria ranging from the no-trade equilibrium to an equilibrium without rationing in the market for commodity 2. However, also in the latter equilibrium there is no trade, although it is potentially different from the former no-trade equilibrium.
Step 3. It is shown that there is no underemployment equilibrium (
where z * 2 1 = 0 or z * 1 3 = 0, not being equal to the Walrasian equilibrium. Clearly, either z * 1 3 is binding for household 1, or z * 1 3 is not binding for household 1. In the latter case, household 1 demands x * 1 , which is only compatible with a Walrasian equilibrium. Consequently, the only way to obtain an underemployment equilibrium not being equal to the Walrasian equilibrium is by having a binding z * 1 3 for household 1. Let a ∈ −IR + be such that d
1 , which leads to a contradiction as in Step 1. Consequently, z * 1 3 > a and is binding for household 1. Now, either z * 1 1 is binding for household 1, or z * 1 1 is non-binding for household 1. In the latter case, using z * 1 In Example 4.3 the conditions of Theorem 3.2 cannot be satisfied, since there are only two different underemployment equilibria. In this example it holds that δ 1 ( p
For this situation to occur it is necessary that household 2 that is a supplier of commodity 2 at the Walrasian equilibrium, is no longer willing to supply this commodity if it expects no supply possibilities of commodities 1 and 3. Also the extension of Theorem 3.1.iii to L I = 0 does not apply. Let us denote the excess demand correspondence, which is a function now, by z, and let us surpress the dependence on p, which is constant, and y, which is redundant. Let (p * , x * , z * ) denote the competitive equilibrium for the economy of Example 4.3. Now consider −z ≤ −z * that arises from keeping z 2 at competitive values, and decreasing z 1 and z 3 away from competitive values. Since z * is non-binding, initially these decrements have no effect, z(z) = 0, and A7 is satisfied. Without loss of generality, either z 1 or z 3 becomes binding after a sufficiently large decrement. In both cases it is easily verified that z 2 (z) > max l∈{1,3} z l (z), contradicting A7 and contradicting also the weaker version of A7 used in the proof. Indeed, limited expected supply possibilities in the market for commodity 3 lead to a strongly positive demand for commodity 2 by household 1. The demand for commodity 2 increases even more than the demand for commodity 3, a strong complementarity. Analogously, limited expected supply possibilities in the market for commodity 1 lead to a strongly positive demand for commodity 2 by household 2. Again, the demand for commodity 2 increases even more than the demand for commodity 1. Theorem 3.1.iii shows that if one rules out such strong complementarities, then the situation of Example 4.3 does not occur and there is a continuum of strongly different equilibrium allocations ranging from an approximate no-trade equilibrium to a competitive equilibrium.
Appendix: Proofs
A first step in the proof is to show that the production possibility correspondences and budget correspondences are continuous. We compactify the consumption sets and the production possibility sets using the number b as defined in Subsection 3.2, so
It follows from a standard argument that there is no loss of generality in using the compactified consumption and production sets when studying the existence of underemployment equilibria. The feasible production plans, supply, budget, and demand correspondences derived from X h and Y h are denoted by s f , η f , γ h , and δ h , respectively.
Let us define the set P of prices, expected opportunities, and wealths by
Lemma A.1 Let the economy E satisfy A1-A5. Then the production possibility correspondence s f : + converging to y f , and let the sequence (y f n ) n∈IN be such that y f n ∈ s f (y f n ). Clearly, (y f n ) n∈IN remains in a compact set. Therefore, it has a converging subsequence, also denoted by (y f n ) n∈IN , converging to, say, y f ∈ Y f . It has to be shown
Next lower hemi-continuity of the production possibility correspondence is shown.
, and for l ∈ L it holds that y
Compact-valuedness and convex-valuedness of γ h are trivial. Let us show upper hemicontinuity of the budget correspondence. Let some (p, z h , w h ) ∈ P be given, let (p n , z h n , w h n ) n∈IN be a sequence in P converging to (p, z h , w h ), and let the sequence (x h n ) n∈IN be such that
Clearly, (x h n ) n∈IN remains in a compact set. Therefore, it has a converging subsequence, also denoted by (x h n ) n∈IN , converging to, say,
Finally, lower hemi-continuity of the budget correspondence is shown. Let some (p,
For n ∈ IN, let x h n be defined by
and for l ∈ L,
, and 
where µ h n is given by µ
Notice that µ h n ∈ (0, 1) in the latter case.
As before, it is easy to verify that 
Now we construct a correspondence ζ such that its zero points correspond to all potentially different underemployment equilibria. Denote the minimal market share in the market for a commodity l ∈ L II by α l , so α l = min{α
where φ 1 (q) determines the expected opportunities of the households and φ 2 (q) the expected opportunities of the firms. So, for l ∈ L II , q l ∈ [0, 1] parametrizes the expected opportunities in the market for commodity l, (
The parameter q l coincides with υ l as defined in Subsection 3.2.
The correspondence
The restriction of ζ to the set (IR
ζ | p II is a compact-valued and convex-valued correspondence that is upper hemi-continuous everywhere, except at the point ((0, p II ), 0).
The set of zero points of ζ
To prove Theorem 3.1.i we will use a fixed point theorem. In fact, Browder's fixed point theorem (see Browder (1960) ), and the extension of it to correspondences as stated in Theorem A.3 (see Mas-Colell (1974) , Theorem 3, page 230) will be needed in the proof. -valued, convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Then the set
and, for ε ≥ 0, the subset of the cube satisfying that each of its elements has at least one component greater than or equal to ε by
∅} has a very special structure as the following result shows.
compact, and therefore there exists a compact,
The compact-valued, convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondences
It follows that the correspondence ϕ :
is a compact-valued, convex-valued, and upper hemi-continuous correspondence, and the set Z ×S L I ×S L II −1 is non-empty, compact, and convex. By Theorem A.3 it follows that the
it follows by taking s equal to the l-th, respectively (l + 1)-th, unit vector that z * I
and the set Z 
The correspondence ζ has a continuum of points with a non-positive vector in its image set. These points range from a point on the boundary of Q L II (ε) with every component less than or equal to ε to a point on the boundary of Q L II (ε) where at least one component equals one.
We are now in a position to give a proof of Theorem 3.1.i. One of the problems we have to deal with is the possible lack of upper hemi-continuity of ζ at a point ((0, p II ), 0).
Proof of Theorem 3.1.i
Let some ε > 0 be given. Notice that ( that assigns to r ∈ R the set of points q ∈ ϕ(r) maximizing g(r, q) on ϕ(r) is an upper hemi-continuous, compact-valued correspondence by the maximum theorem. Since ϕ(r) is convex for every r ∈ R it follows that there is a unique maximizer. It is clear that the correspondence coincides with ρ, so ρ is a continuous function. Using the first-order conditions it follows that if ρ(r) = q, then either l∈L r l = L and ρ(r) = 1 or l∈L r l < L and there is λ ∈ IR, µ l ≥ 0, l ∈ L, ν l ≥ 0, l ∈ L, such that, for every l ∈ L, q l = r l −λ+µ l −ν l , µ l q l = 0 and ν l (q l − 1) = 0. The set ∆ is defined by ∆ = {δ ∈ IR L | l∈L δ l = 0 and δ l ≥ −1, ∀l ∈ L}. Then δ + λ1 ∈ R for every δ ∈ ∆ and λ ∈ [ε, 1], with 1 the vector of all ones. The continuous 5 A7 leads to the following property: ∀q ∈ B L , if q l = 1, then z l (q) ≤ 0. Let some q ∈ B L be given.
If z(q) = 0, then Condition (2) is satisfied. If z(q) = 0, then q is not the vector of all ones. Let l ∈ L be such that q l = 1. Then q l > min l∈L q l , and z l (q) ≤ 0 < max l∈L z l (q). 
and it follows that there is a continuum of strongly different underemployment equilibria. Q.E.D.
